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A Defense of Analogical Reasoning in Law
Emily Sherwint
This Article defends the practice of reasoning by analogy on the basis of its epistemic
and institutional advantages. The advantages identified for analogical reasoning include
that it produces a wealth of data for decisonmaking; it represents the collaborative effort of
a number of judges over time; it tends to correct biases that might lead judges to discount
the force of prior decisions; and it exerts a conservative force in law, holding the develop-
ment of law to a gradual pace. Notably, these advantages do not depend on the rational
force of analogical reasoning. Rather, the author contends that, as open-ended reasoning
and analogical reasoning alike may sometimes result in incorrect decisions, these qualities
of analogical reasoning make it a desirable method of deciding legal disputes.
The method by which judges perform their work-that is, the
form of reasoning they use in reaching decisions-is a subject of
continuing controversy. According to traditional understanding,
judges engage in a special form of reasoning, the method of anal-
ogy. Closely related to the analogical method of reasoning is the
assumption that judges will follow the course suggested by anal-
ogy and thus conform their decisions to the existing body of law.
My object in this Article is to defend this traditional practice and
in doing so to answer some recent objections to analogical rea-
soning in law.
My argument is based on the epistemic and institutional ad-
vantages of the practice of analogical reasoning. Not all propo-
nents of the analogical method will welcome my contribution, be-
cause I concede that analogical reasoning is an unscientific prac-
tice with imperfect results and then proceed to defend it on con-
servative grounds. Nevertheless, I believe this is the best way to
explain the endurance and success of both the common law and
the analogical method that supports it.
I. ANALOGICAL REASONING
The analogical method, as commonly practiced, works some-
thing like this: confronted with an unsettled question, the judge
surveys past decisions, identifies ways in which these decisions
are similar to or different from each other and the question before
her, and develops a principle that captures the similarities and
differences she considers important.' This principle in turn pro-
t Professor of Law, University of San Diego School of Law. Thanks to Larry Alexan-
der, Kevin Clermont, Maimon Schwarzschild, and Cass Sunstein for helpful comments.
See, for example, Edward Levi, An Introduction to Legal Reasoning 1-6 (Chicago
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vides the basis for the judge's own decision.2 Whatever one may
think about the merits of analogical decisionmaking, there is lit-
tle question that judges writing opinions and lawyers addressing
judges often cast their analysis in this form.
In their writings on the legal process, Henry Hart and Albert
Sacks refer to this method of judicial decisionmaking as "rea-
soned elaboration" of law, to be distinguished from an exercise of
"discretionary fiat."3 The virtue of reasoned elaboration, Hart and
Sacks suggest, is that it forces courts to decide cases in a manner
that is consistent with the expectations of the parties at the time
they acted.4 When courts build on past decisions, law is predict-
able even as it evolves to fit new cases.
Another well known description of legal reasoning by analogy
comes from Edward Levi. According to Levi, a judge reasoning by
analogy studies the facts and outcomes of a case she deems simi-
lar to the case before her, formulates the rule "inherent" in the
prior case, and then uses it to decide her case.5 What Levi sees in
this method is a way for law to adapt to the changing circum-
stances and beliefs of the surrounding community.6 Rules of law
are "remade with each case."7
In Law's Empire, Ronald Dworkin redescribes the traditional
method of legal reasoning by analogy as a source of "integrity" in
law.' As Dworkin explains it, the task of judges is to construct le-
gal principles that meet a threshold of "fit" with prior decisions
and at the same time represent, the "best" possible understanding
1949); Cass R. Sunstein, Legal Reasoning and Political Conflict 62-100 (Oxford 1996);
Scott Brewer, Exemplary Reasoning: Semantics, Pragmatics, and the Rational Force of Le-
gal Argument by Analogy, 109 Harv L Rev 925, 925-29, 962-63 (1996). See also Ronald
Dworkin, Law's Empire 228-38 (Belknap 1980) (characterizing law as a "chain novel").
' My discussion focuses on the development of common law in the absence of a stat-
ute, but much the same method can be applied to interpretation of statutes over a period
of time. See Dworkin, Law's Empire at 313-54 (cited in note 1) (identifying statutes as part
of the "chain of law"); Sunstein, Political Conflict at 83-90 (cited in note 1) (providing ex-
amples of analogy in statutory interpretation); Brewer, 109 Harv L Rev at 937-38 (cited in
note 1) (offering the ejusdem generis canon of statutory construction as an example of ex-
emplary reasoning).
Henry M. Hart, Jr. and Albert M. Sacks, The Legal Process: Basic Problems in the
Making and Application of Law 147-48, 372-77 (Foundation 1994) (William N. Eskridge,
Jr. and Philip P. Frickey, eds) (arguing that, in the case of the "burnt bundles," Justice
Shaw of the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court succeeded in part and failed in part to
apply the method of reasoned elaboration to the previously undecided question of a rail-
road's liability for harm to goods). See Norway Plains Co v Boston & Maine Railroad, 1
Gray 263, 268 (Mass 1854).
Hart and Sacks, Legal Process at 398 (cited in note 3).
Levi, Legal Reasoning at 1-2 (cited in note 1).
' Id at 2-4.
SId at 2.
Dworkin, Law's Empire at 94-96, 225-75 (cited in note 1).
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of those decisions, according to the judge's own moral and politi-
cal sense For Dworkin, the virtue of principles that can be fitted
to existing legal materials is that they "secur[e] a kind of equality
among citizens that makes their community more genuine and
improves its moral justification for exercising the political power
it does.""0
More recently, Cass Sunstein has defended analogical rea-
soning in law as one of several ways in which a society can reach
practical agreement against a background of moral controversy.
In Sunstein's version of legal reasoning, judges reason from case
to case, arriving at low-level reasons why some cases are rele-
vantly similar to others without developing a full theory of deci-
sion." The principal virtue of the method, for Sunstein, is that
people who disagree at the level of comprehensive theory may
nevertheless be able to agree on low-level analogies among cases.
By fixing on modest principles of similarity, courts can settle
pressing questions while not taking controversial moral and po-
litical positions that are difficult for judges to concur in and for
parties to accept."2
While the method of analogy is much discussed, its rational
force and its position among forms of logic remain somewhat ob-
scure. The most thorough analysis comes from Scott Brewer, who
likens analogical reasoning to a Rawlsian process of reflective
equilibrium.'3 As Brewer explains the method of analogy, a rea-
soner seeking to resolve a problem casts about for examples that,
either intuitively or by conventional association, promise to be
fruitful sources for comparison with the problem at hand. Then
the reasoner "abduces" from these examples a tentative "analogy-
warranting rule" that posits a logical relation, inductive or deduc-
tive, between the examples and the problem. 4 Next, the reasoner
' Id at 254-58.
,Id at 96.
"Sunstein, Political Conflict at 65-69 (cited in note 1).
22 Id at 41 ("When the authoritative rationale for the result is disconnected from ab-
stract theories of the good and the right, the losers can submit to legal obligations, even if
reluctantly, without being forced to renounce their largest ideals."); id at 91 CWithin the
legal culture, analogical reasoning imposes a certain discipline, and a widespread moral or
political consensus is therefore unnecessary. Hence, people who could not use analogies to
reach closure in politics or morality can often do so in law.").
" Brewer, 109 Harv L Rev at 938-39 (cited in note 1) (describing the process of"reflec-
tive adjustment" a reasoner must go through when confronted with a particular example
that conflicts with a general principle that the reasoner had tentatively accepted); id at
962-63, 1023 (explaining how "reflective adjustment" is used in the course of analogical
reasoning to confirm or discard an analogy-warranting rule). On reflective equilibrium as
a method of moral reasoning, see John Rawls, A Theory of Justice 46-53 (Belknap 1971).
" Brewer, 109 Harv L Rev at 962 (cited in note 1).
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confirms the rule by testing it "up" against possible "analogy-
warranting rationales" and "down" against further examples.15 If
the analogy-warranting rule survives this process, it becomes
likely that what is true for the examples is also true for the
problem case. 6 Thus, in Brewer's view, the method of analogy has
at least some rational force, although its conclusions are neither
inductively demonstrated nor deductively proven.17
Suppose, for example, that a court faces a case in which the
defendant, a contractor, found buried money under the plaintiff's
garage. 8 The court surveys past cases having to do with things
lost and found and finds the following:
(1) several cases in which someone found money on the floor
of a shop or similar premises and the courts held that the finder
was entitled to retain possession as long as the owner of the lost
property was not known;' 9
(2) several cases in which someone found money on a table in
a shop or on a chair in a bank safe deposit room and the courts
held that the owner of the place where the money was found was
entitled to possession;" and
'5 Id at 1022-23.
"Id at 1022 CBy supplying criteria of acceptability, the [analogy-warranting ration-
ale] plays the vital role in exemplary reasoning of guiding the reasoner toward judgements
of truth.").
" Id at 954-55 "Skeptics... are right to think that analogical argument does not have
the same degree of rational force as induction or deduction. But they perhaps overlook the
significant constraints on analogical arguments by failing to see that ... induction (in
some contexts) and deduction (in other contexts) actually plays a vital role in analogical
argument."). Howard Margolis has taken the interesting position that all human reason-
ing is "patterned" or analogical in nature. See Howard Margolis, Patterns, Thinking, and
Cognition: A Theory of Judgment (Chicago 1987). Margolis argues that wve analyze new
situations by searching for "cues" that trigger patterns familiar from previous experience.
This process of association allows us to reach an initial conclusion about the new situa-
tion, which can then be refined by comparison with other known patterns. The method of
reasoning Margolis describes is path dependent and therefore necessarily imperfect. Yet it
is the means by which our minds progress from one point to another.
"This is taken loosely from the facts of Schley v Couch, 284 SW2d 333 (Tex 1955)
(holding buried property to belong to the owner of the premises on which it was found be-
cause it is more appropriately considered mislaid than lost property).
" See, for example, Bridges v Hawkesworth, 21 L J Q B 75 (1851) (holding that finder
has title to a bundle of notes found on a shop floor against all but the true owner).
See, for example, McAvoy v Medina, 11 Allen 548 (Mass 1866) (holding pocketbook
left on a table in a shop to be mislaid property and thus granting ownership of the pocket-
book to the owner of the shop against the finder); Pyle v Springfield Marine Bank, 330 Inl
App 1, 70 NE2d 257 (1946) (holding that a bank has right of possession against a finder of
a treasury note found on the floor of the bank's vault room because the vault room was a
private place).
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(3) a case in which someone found a brooch on a window
ledge in a house temporarily requisitioned by the government
and the court held that the finder was entitled to possession.2
The court might then propose the following analogy-
warranting rule: when property is found in circumstances that
suggest its owner set it down deliberately and then forgot it, the
right to possession should go to the owner of the place where the
property was found. If, however, it seems that the owner dropped
the property inadvertently, possession should go to the finder.
This rule leaves one possibly recalcitrant case (the case of the
brooch), but the rule appears to be justified by a broader analogy-
warranting rationale-that owners who have set property down
and then forgotten it are more likely to return to the site than
those who have dropped their property inadvertently. The more
likely the owner is to return, the less appealing it is to award the
property to finders who are comparatively more difficult for the
owner of the lost property to trace. These ideas in turn can be
tested at higher levels of generality: a rule designed to return lost
property to its owner will make property rights more secure, se-
cure property rights contribute to general prosperity, and so
forth. The analogy-warranting rule can also be tested against hy-
pothetical future cases to see if it produces satisfying outcomes. If
the results of testing are acceptable, and if we assume that the
prior decisions were correct, we may now have some reason to
believe that the money found under the garage should stay with
the owners of the house.
II. OBJECTIONS TO THE ANALOGICAL METHOD
Analogical reasoning as a method of resolving legal disputes
is not universally admired. Legal realists viewed analogical rea-
soning as infinitely malleable and therefore scorned the notion
that it could restrain judges from doing as they pleased.2 More
recently, the validity of analogical reasoning has been questioned
by rationalists who find it logically flawed and possibly incoher-
ent.2
3
21 Hannah v Peel, 1 KB 509 (1945).
See, for example, Karl N. Llewellyn, The Bramble Bush 66-69 (Oceana 1969) (con-
tending that judges use a strict view of precedent to get rid of "troublesome" precedents
and a weak view of precedent to keep "helpful" precedents).
See, for example, Richard A. Posner, The Problems of Jurisprudence 86-98 (Harvard
1990) (arguing that analogical reasoning "denotes an unstable class of disparate reasoning
methods," some harmful); Frederick Schauer, Playing by the Rules: A Philosophical Ex-
amination of Rule-Based Decision-Making in Law and in Life 183-87, esp 187 (Oxford
1995) (describing analogical reasoning as a form of deduction from rules); Larry Alexan-
der, Bad Beginnings, 145 U Pa L Rev 57, 80-86 (1996) (arguing that analogical reasoning
1999] 1183
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Frederick Schauer, for example, suggests that analogical
reasoning is either a form of deduction from rules, or nothing at
all.24 If the prior decision is no more than a result reached on a
given set of facts, the present judge must construct a generaliza-
tion that encompasses both the prior case and the case before her,
and it is this generalization that drives the judge's decision.25 If,
instead, the necessary generalization is contained in the prior de-
cision, either expressly or by implication from natural or cultur-
ally determined categories, the present judge is simply applying a
rule.26 There is no special analogical form of reasoning involved.
Richard Posner is similarly skeptical about analogy as a form
of reasoning. Posner suggests that what passes as analogical rea-
soning in law is sometimes a perilous form of induction (perilous
because of its normative element), sometimes a practice of deduc-
tion from rules that have not been fully justified, sometimes a
reference to prior cases as nonauthoritative sources of informa-
tion, and sometimes a rhetorical device that obscures the grounds
of decision." The analogical method may be useful as a test of
existing legal rules, and it may add stability to law, but in Pos-
ner's view judges would do better by engaging in straightforward
analysis of the relative importance of stability and correct deci-
sionmaking. 8
The most pointed and comprehensive recent criticism of the
method of analogy comes from Larry Alexander. 9 Like Schauer
and Posner, Alexander questions whether analogical reasoning in
law is a distinct form of reasoning, but his main focus is on the in-
feriority of analogical decisionmaking to ordinary moral reason-
ing. Analogical reasoning, unlike reflective equilibrium, starts
with the prior decisions of others rather than the reasoner's own
observations and intuitions. Because judges are fallible, some of
in law is flawed because it relies on legal principles from past decisions even though many
past decisions must be morally mistaken).
Schauer, Playing by the Rules at 182-87 (cited in note 23).
Id at 184.
Id at 187 ('[E]xcept for the fact that the lack of a canonical formulation of a factual
predicate substantially increases the indeterminacy of the rule set forth in the precedent
case .... nothing about a precedent-based constraint uniquely differentiates it from rule-
based constraint.").
Posner, Problems of Jurisprudence at 86-98 (cited in note 23).
Id at 90-91.
Alexander, 145 U Pa L Rev at 80-86 (cited in note 23). See also Larry Alexander, In-
complete Theorizing: A Review Essay of Cass R. Sunstein's Legal Reasoning and Political
Conflict, 72 Notre Dame L Rev 531, 535-41 (1997) (criticizing Sunstein's arguments for
analogical reasoning); Larry Alexander and Ken Kress, Against Legal Principles, in An-
drei Marmor, ed, Law and Interpretation 279 (Clarendon 1995) (criticizing Dworkin's "le-
gal principles"); Larry Alexander, Constrained By Precedent, 63 S Cal L Rev 3, 28-48
(1989) (criticizing "result models" of precedent).
[66:11791184
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these prior decisions are sure to be wrong. Thus, the basic data
are flawed and decisionmaking by analogy will simply entrench
the errors of the past."
To be sure, a judge's moral reasoning also may be flawed,
but, Alexander argues, it at least represents the judge's best ef-
forts to avoid error. In contrast, analogical reasoning-to the ex-
tent it diverges from the judge's own moral judgment-works de-
liberately from a set of decisions that the judge believes are not
all correct in fact. As Alexander puts it, analogical reasoning asks
the question, "What would be the morally correct outcomes, in a
world in which some morally incorrect outcomes in our world
were morally correct?""1 In Alexander's view, not only must the
answer to such a question be normatively unattractive, but the
question itself is nonsense.
Having dismissed the method of analogy, Alexander main-
tains that the only legitimate forms of legal reasoning are
straightforward moral reasoning-determining what is best, all
things considered-and deduction from authoritative rules." The
outcomes of past cases are important only insofar as people have
relied on them, and reliance is a consideration that can be fully
accounted for in the course of ordinary moral reasoning." Alex-
ander allows that, for reasons of guidance, predictability, and co-
ordination, judges should sometimes announce rules in canonical
form, and that future judges should treat these rules as binding.34
A rule of precedent requiring judges to follow rules announced in
past cases, even when they believe the rules are wrong, prevents
judges from underestimating reliance or undervaluing other rule-
of-law virtues. 5 But, in the absence of a rule, judges should exer-
cise their moral judgment to the best of their abilities rather than
incorporate the mistakes of the past.
Alexander, 145 U Pa L Rev at 80-87 (cited in note 23). Of course, the problem of en-
trenched error is present when judges apply the principle of stare decisis in any form, in-
cluding adherence to canonical rules announced in past cases. In Alexander's view, how-
ever, analogical decisionmaking carries the cost of entrenched error without the benefits of
guidance and stability associated with canonical rules. Id at 81-82.
" Id at 86-87 n 96.
2 Id at 70-71.
' Id at 81 ("Ordinary moral reasoning will take account of all the present effects of
past decisions, including morally erroneous ones. Because we operate morally in the world
as we find it-a world in which many of its features are the residue of past mistakes-we
must take account of those mistakes in order to act morally.").
"A rule is "canonical" when it has been given a particular authoritative formulation.
On canonicity, see Schauer, Playing by the Rules at 68-72 (cited in note 23).
Alexander, 63 S Cal L Rev at 48-51 (cited in note 29).
1999] 1185
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III. A DEFENSE OF THE ANALOGICAL METHOD
While I accept much of what these critics say about analogi-
cal reasoning in law, I believe they have overlooked some of its
potential virtues and have not considered it in its most attractive
form. My own defense of analogical reasoning follows a somewhat
different route than others have taken. I disagree with Levi's
suggestion that analogy is a promising vehicle for legal change. I
doubt whether equality (what Dworkin calls "integrity") can jus-
tify a judge in reaching a decision she believes is wrong; there-
fore, equality does not play a part in my argument."6 I think there
may be something to Sunstein's argument that analogy can serve
as a means of "incompletely theorized" agreement, but this is not
the approach I will take. I agree with Hart and Sacks that a pro-
cess of elaboration from past cases adds to the predictability of
law, and I will incorporate their argument as part of my own. But
I do not think this is all that can be said on behalf of analogical
reasoning.
In my view, the virtue of analogical reasoning lies in a vari-
ety of indirect benefits that are likely to result when judges adopt
it as a practice and consider themselves obliged to explain new
decisions in terms of their relation to past cases. First, a diligent
process of studying and comparing prior decisions produces a
wealth of data for decisionmaking. Second, the rules and princi-
ples that result from analogical reasoning represent the collabo-
rative efforts of a number of judges over time. Third, analogical
reasoning tends to correct biases that might otherwise lead
judges to discount the likelihood or importance of reliance on
prior decisions. Fourth, analogical reasoning exerts a conserva-
tive force on law: by holding the development of law to a gradual
pace, it limits the scope of error and contributes to public accep-
tance of law as a standard of conduct.
As I have suggested, these advantages are indirect. They are
not attributable to the rational force of the analogical method,
and they are consistent with the claim that the results of analogi-
cal reasoning will sometimes be wrong. Open-ended moral rea-
soning, however, is also subject to error. If I am right about these
indirect benefits, analogical reasoning may result in better deci-
sions and rules overall.
The case for analogical reasoning in law begins with certain
background assumptions about the circumstances of judges. As-
sume that the judge in question is an appellate judge deciding
See Alexander, 145 U Pa L Rev at 85-86 (cited in note 23); Alexander and Kress,
Against Legal Principles at 294-95 (cited in note 29).
1186 [66:1179
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how to vote and how to draft an opinion. This judge faces a single
case based on specific events in the lives of individuals, which are
described in the record of the case. She has limited time to spend
on the case and has no option but to decide in favor of one party
or another. The facts before her are simplified both by the rules of
evidence at trial and by the manner in which the trial has been
reported. She is expected to articulate reasons for her decision
that operate at some intermediate level of generality. Parties,
critics, and other judges will be disappointed if she decides either
"because the facts are thus" or "because I believe this is best." Fi-
nally, the judge is fallible-she makes factual, logical, and moral
mistakes.
A. Exposure to Examples
In these circumstances, one simple advantage of the analogi-
cal method of decisionmaking is that past cases provide the judge
with a ready supply of examples from which to develop reasons
for decision. Tentative reasons for decision may be suggested by
the explanations that prior judges have given for their decisions,
or reasons may surface intuitively as the judge looks for similari-
ties and differences among the cases. Once the judge has arrived
at tentative reasons for her own decision, she can check and re-
fine them by examining how they might apply to the facts of, or
facts suggested by, past cases. She might invent hypothetical
cases for this purpose, but these are likely to be overly simple in
comparison to actual, decided cases. It is true that reported cases
will contain only a limited set of facts, selected by the same falli-
ble judge who decided the case." Nevertheless, past cases re-
solving real disputes are likely to be more realistic and more de-
tailed than examples the present judge might conceive in the
short time she has to make a decision.
The critic of analogical reasoning might respond that of
course it is useful for the judge to survey past decisions in the
process of deliberation, but there is no justification for accepting
cases the judge believes were wrongly decided as fixed starting
points for her own decision.3" The judge should study past cases,
but if she believes they are wrong, she should not endeavor to
make her decision consistent with them. Building from them
' See Alexander, 63 S Cal L Rev at 42-44 (cited in note 29) (arguing that facts are
screened through rationales).
' See Posner, Problems of Jurisprudence at 89-92 (cited in note 23) (discussing the use
of past decisions as nonauthoritative sources of data about past experience).
1999] 1187
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simply ensures that her own decision will be less accurate than it
otherwise might be.
If we could count on judges to engage in a meticulous study
of past cases in the process of reaching independent decisions,
this criticism might be persuasive. But when cases must be de-
cided quickly, a judge cut free from the obligation to reconcile her
own decision with past decisions will often find it easiest to apply
her own judgment, perhaps tested against a few rapidly com-
posed hypotheticals. If, in contrast, she feels obliged to seek
analogies, she has reason to sift more carefully through reported
opinions. In other words, the practice of analogical reasoning
from past decisions has procedural benefits that go beyond the
rational force it carries in any particular case. It produces a
habit, a method, that will lead judges to do the intellectual work
of study and comparison.
This p6int applies with particular force when judges design
general rules of common law for future application. Like Alexan-
der and Schauer, I take it to be desirable and possibly inevitable
that judges should announce general rules from time to time.
Casting a decision in general terms, as a rule for future cases, has
important advantages for guidance and coordination.39
The difficulty with this position is that adjudication is not an
ideal setting for fashioning rules of general application. A judge
focuses her attention primarily on the facts before her, facts pre-
sented by the parties to a single dispute. Others who might be af-
fected by a general rule announced by the judge are not repre-
sented in the proceeding and will be remote in the mind of the
judge. In these circumstances, the process of reviewing and sort-
ing cases in the course of analogical reasoning will give the judge
a better sense of the field of possibilities to which her rule might
apply. And once again, judges are more likely to undertake a re-
view of past cases if they feel obliged to do so in the course of
reaching a decision.
Past decisions are not the only sources of ideas that a judge
might usefully study. Alexander suggests, for example, that a
judge might find the moral judgments of the Harvard Philosophy
See Alexander, 63 S Cal L Rev at 48-51 (cited in note 29) (explaining the need for
judicial rules). On rules generally, see Joseph Raz, The Morality of Freedom 42-57
(Clarendon 1986) (discussing the "normal justification" of authoritative rules and the rela-
tionship of justified rules to the ends of rule-subjects); Schauer, Playing by the Rules at 35-
66 (cited in note 23) (outlining reasons for authoritative rules); Larry Alexander and
Emily Sherwin, Past Imperfect. Rules, Principles, and Dilemmas of Law ch 5 (unpublished
manuscript on file with U Chi L Rev) (discussing the need for authoritative rules and the
problems such rules cause).
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Department more helpful than the judgments of past courts. 40 Yet
it is all too easy to overlook the potential consequences of a com-
prehensive moral theory when applying it to just one case. The
method of analogy minimizes this danger by drawing the judge's
attention to an array of concrete situations and placing the judge
in the posture of reflective equilibrium.
B. Collaboration
Moving to the second advantage of analogical reasoning,
there is reason to think that, at least in some circumstances, past
decisions will yield sound insights. Suppose, for example, that the
judge discovers a group of cases that she considers similar to the
case before her. These cases were decided over a period of time,
but none of them is seriously outdated. Newer cases refer with
approval to older cases in the group. None of the cases states a
canonical rule governing the present case, but if taken together
they imply a principle-an analogy-warranting rule-that would
also provide an answer to the present case.
The judge may not be persuaded that the principle implied
by the line of past cases is the best ground on which to decide,
and she may think some cases in the line were wrongly decided.
Nevertheless, if the pattern of the decisions and the remarks of
the judges who decided them suggest a common idea, that idea is
worth attending to because it represents the collective reasoning
of a number of judges over time. Because judges are fallible, the
idea running through the cases may be mistaken. But the rea-
soning of the present judge also may be mistaken. Other things
being equal, the epistemic advantage lies with an idea or princi-
ple that has been developed and accepted collectively over time.
The type of collective effort brought about by the analogical
method is particularly important in the development of judicial
rules. For the reasons given earlier, a single judge is not particu-
larly well situated to formulate rules to govern a range of future
cases. When judges work by analogy and give precedential weight
to the results of analogical reasoning, they can develop rules
gradually and postpone stating them in canonical form until the
rules have passed through a number of hands and proved effec-
tive in a variety of settings.
The suggestion that principles developed over time have
epistemic value is not new, of course. Lord Coke, for one, said
that "if all the reason that is dispersed into so many severall
Alexander, 145 U Pa L Rev at 74 (cited in note 23). See also Posner, Problems of Ju-
risprudence at 94-95 (cited in note 23) (discussing alternative sources for judicial decision).
1999] 1189
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heads, were united into one, yet could he not make such a law as
the law in England is; because by many successions of ages it
hath beene fined and refined by an infinite number of grave and
learned men, and by long experience growne to such a perfection.
". .,,4 Edmund Burke warned that one great danger of revolution
was its effect on "the science of jurisprudence, the pride of the
human intellect, which, with all its defects, redundancies, and er-
rors is the collected reason of the ages, combining the principles
of original justice with the infinite variety of human concerns."42
Critics might reply that the epistemic value of a pattern of
decisions is merely something that present judges should take
into account in their own reasoning. They should give the fact of
collective acceptance over time the respect they think it deserves,
but no more. Yet once a judge has reached an independent con-
clusion about how a case should be decided, it will be psychologi-
cally difficult for her to assign significant epistemic value to con-
trary suggestions.4 3 If, on the other hand, judges assume from the
outset that it is part of their task to conform to the body of past
decisions, they are more likely to give real weight to those deci-
sions.
C. Correction of Bias
More specifically, analogical reasoning also can counteract
the errors of open-ended judgment by building in protection for
reliance. Few would deny that, if people have relied on prior judi-
cial decisions, this is a morally important fact that should play a
part in a judge's reasoning. Reliance creates a reason for the
judge to conform her own decisions to past decisions, even when
' Sir Edward Coke, The First Part of the Institutes of the Laws of England § 138
(Small 1853) (Francis Hargrave and Charles Butler, eds). This passage is quoted by Dean
Pound, though he was not an unqualified believer in reasoning by analogy. Analogies, in
Pound's view, are helpful only if tested "in the light of how they meet or fail to meet the
exigencies of reasonable expectations of men in the time and place." Roscoe Pound, Law
Finding Through Experience and Reason 47 (Georgia 1960).
42 Edmund Burke, Reflections on the Revolution in France, and on the Proceedings in
Certain Societies in London Relative to that Event (1790), reprinted in Edmund Burke, Se-
lected Writings and Speeches 424, 469-70 (Regnery Gateway 1963) (Peter J. Stanlis, ed).
See Robert C. Clark, Contracts, Elites, and Traditions in the Making of Corporate Law, 89
Colum L Rev 1703, 1730-37 (1989) (discussing the pros and cons of tradition as a source of
rules); Isaac Erlich and Richard A. Posner, An Economic Analysis of Legal Rulemaking, 3
J Legal Stud 257, 266-67 (1974) (discussing some of the benefits of decisionmaking ac-
cording to rules).
' See Stuart Oskamp, Overconfidence in Case-Study Judgments, in Daniel Kahne-
man, Paul Slovic and Amos Tversky, eds, Judgement Under Uncertainty 287, 290-92
(Cambridge 1982) (showing that confidence, but not accuracy, increases as information in-
creases).
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she believes the past decisions were wrong. This is the point
made by Hart and Sacks in defense of analogical reasoning from
past decisions.' Critics might respond that while reliance is cer-
tainly of moral concern, it is simply a fact that the judge should
take into account in deciding what to do, all things considered."
Reliance on past decisions should be given exactly the moral
weight it deserves, and no more.
This response to the problem of reliance is unsatisfactory be-
cause judges engaged in open-ended reasoning are particularly
likely to err in calculating the importance of reliance on past de-
cisions. One of the cognitive biases that affects human reasoning
favors information that is salient or "available"-information that
comes readily to mind. We focus quickly on information of this
kind, at the expense of more remote or abstract considerations
that also bear on accurate calculation.46 To give just one example
from the studies, people commonly underestimate the time neces-
sary to complete a project. The best explanation for this error is
that they concentrate their attention on the steps they them-
selves will need to perform and, as a result, fail to consider the
probability that external events may cause a delay. The actor's
own tasks are salient, while background risks are relatively ob-
scure.
47
The circumstances of adjudication make it likely that the
judge will undervalue reliance as a reason to conform to past de-
cisions. The salient facts are the identity of the parties before the
court and the events that led to a dispute between them. The fact
that the parties' own actions were affected by past judicial deci-
sions may catch the judge's attention. But the judge is not likely
to focus with the same clarity on reliance by parties who are sel-
dom identified and are not before the court. The hardship of a
particular defendant in a contract dispute, for example, may loom
larger than the confusion that a novel type of defense might cre-
See generally Hart and Sacks, The Legal Process at 143-45 (cited in note 3).
Alexander, 63 S Cal L Rev at 13-14 (cited in note 29). See also Alexander, 145 U Pa
L Rev at 70, 81-82 (cited in note 23) (characterizing reliance as an ingredient of moral rea-
soning and past decisions as no more than relevant facts about the world).
' See Amos Tversky and Daniel Kahneman, Availability: A Heuristic for Judging Fre-
quence and Probability, in Kahneman, Slovic and Tversky, eds, Judgment Under Uncer-
tainty 163, 163-65, 174-78 (cited in note 43) (explaining the availability bias). Judicial rea-
soning about reliance is also likely to be affected by the hindsight bias, in which outcomes
eclipse antecedent probabilities. See Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, A Positive Psychological Theory
of Judging in Hindsight; 65 U Chi L Rev 571, 571-75, 602-24 (1998) (discussing "hindsight
bias" and the legal mechanisms developed in response).
Daniel Kahneman and Amos Tversky, Intuitive Prediction: Biases and Corrective
Procedures, in Kahneman, Slovic and Tversky, eds, Judgment Under Uncertainty 414,
415-16 (cited in note 43).
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ate in the commercial world.' The practice of analogical reason-
ing, in which judges take past decisions as more or less fixed
starting points for analysis, tends to counteract this bias.
Alexander makes an alternative proposal for counteracting
judicial error in assessment of reliance: that judges should adopt
a rule of precedent that requires them to follow rules announced
in past cases.49 If judges are prone to underestimate reliance,
then in the long run they will make fewer errors by following the
rule than by deciding as they think best, all things considered.
Beyond the special situation of announced rules, however, judges
should simply treat reliance as a fact to be considered in the
course of open-ended reasoning."
This response puts too much weight on the distinction be-
tween canonical rules and noncanonical implications of past deci-
sions. First, this distinction is very difficult to make.5' Moreover,
Alexander's proposal does not fully protect those who rely on ju-
dicial decisions. At least as our legal culture has evolved, reliance
on judicial decisions is not limited to canonical rules. Lawyers
commonly study the facts and outcomes of past decisions, as well
as vague judicial remarks that do not qualify as canonical hold-
ings, in an effort to assess what is likely to happen in cases that
appear similar but are not covered by the holdings themselves. If
delivery wagons have been classified as common carriers and
held strictly liable for losses to goods during transit, a railroad
may be able to anticipate that it too will be held strictly liable,
even if the category of common carriers has not yet been given a
canonical form that includes railroads.52
Analogy, in other words, is not only a judicial practice but an
accepted tool of legal planning. While parties may be more likely
to act in reliance on canonical rules than on the implications of a
pattern of decisions, the difference is only one of degree. And if I
am right that actors and lawyers behave in this way, then
analogical reasoning on the part of judges may serve indirectly to
protect their expectations.
See generally Campbell Soup Co v Wentz, 172 F2d 80, 83-84 (3d Cir 1948) (holding
plaintiffs contract to purchase carrots from defendant was unenforceable in equity be-
cause the "sum total of its provisions drives too hard a bargain for a court of conscience to
assist").
Alexander, 145 U Pa L Rev at 70 (cited in note 23); Alexander, 63 S Cal L Rev at 48-
51 (cited in note 29).
Alexander, 145 U Pa L Rev at 70 (cited in note 23).
" See Llewellyn, Bramble Bush at 41-52 (cited in note 22) (giving examples of the dif-
ficulty of distinguishing among facts, holdings, rationales, and dicta).
See generally Norway Plains v Boston & Maine Railroad, 1 Gray 263 (Mass 1854)
(holding a railroad liable as common carrier during transit).
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It might be said that the argument I have just made has a
circular quality: were it not for the common practice of analogical
reasoning by judges-a practice critics view as undesirable-ac-
tors and their lawyers would not rely on noncanonical implica-
tions of past cases in the manner I describe. Yet reliance of this
kind may be something we want to encourage. People can act
more confidently if there is some basis for predicting not only
what will happen in cases covered by canonical rules but also
what direction the law is likely to take.
D. Evolutionary Decisionmaking
My argument so far has been that the practice of analogical
reasoning by judges may produce fewer errors than a straight-
forward analysis of what is best, for reasons that are independent
of the actual rational force of analogy. Analogical reasoning forces
judges to the task of reflective equilibrium, which is likely to im-
prove the overall quality of judicial reasoning and rulemaking,
even if some of the reference points for reflection are wrong.
Analogical reasoning incorporates the insights of many judges
over time. It also works indirectly to protect against insufficient
judicial attention to reliance on past decisions. For these reasons,
while analogical reasoning will build some errors into the law, it
may nevertheless produce better decisions than judges would
reach if they followed their best unguided judgment.
Analogical reasoning has another set of benefits, which are
not epistemic but institutional. These benefits arise from the role
that the method of analogy plays in preserving the evolutionary
character of the common law. When judges reason from and at-
tempt to conform to a body of existing decisions, their own deci-
sions and the rules they announce are likely to be modest. Ac-
cordingly, law will develop and change in an incremental manner.
There are notorious exceptions, such as the constitutional "right
to privacy" developed by the Supreme Court53 and the "implied
warranty of habitability" grafted onto landlord-tenant law by
Judge Skelly Wright. 4 But in general the method of analogy is
not conducive to wide-ranging conclusions: small innovations and
modest rules are easier to reconcile with past decisions than large
See Griswold v Connecticut, 381 US 479 (1965) (finding evidence of a right to pri-
vacy in cases interpreting the Bill of Rights).
Javins v First National Realty Corp, 428 F2d 1071, 1077-80 (DC Cir 1970) (finding
"implied warranty of habitability" where tenants refused to pay rent after alleging that
landlord had violated approximately 1,500 of the Housing Regulations of the District of
Columbia).
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new ideas. Overall, therefore, analogical reasoning favors an in-
cremental, evolutionary rate of legal development and change.
One reason why it might be desirable for judges to proceed at
a slow pace is that the damage any one mistaken judge can cause
is limited. There will be errors, and once made, these errors will
enter into the body of law to which future judges are expected to
refer. But because judges are unlikely to announce sweeping
rules, their mistakes will seldom be catastrophes. Lines of deci-
sion may sometimes evolve into dead ends, but when this be-
comes evident the line can be overruled by statute or, in obvious
cases, by a court. The ability to trace the development of a doc-
trine over time may in fact make it easier to see whether and why
that doctrine is a mistake.
More important than this, however, is the relationship be-
tween evolutionary decisionmaking and public acceptance of law.
No system of law can be satisfactory if it relies exclusively on
sanctions to secure obedience to its rules. It will fare much better
if most of those who are subject to law look on legal rules as
proper standards for their own and others' conduct." And the
public is most likely to take this view if law remains within the
range of prevailing values and expectations. If law is too disrup-
tive of accepted beliefs or patterns of life, or too unfamiliar in its
demands, it will be viewed by its subjects as a set of alien com-
mands.
On the legislative side, accountability to a majority of voters
and the inertia of political processes may prevent legislation from
moving too far out of line with the society it governs. Judges, in
contrast, are limited primarily by the conservative tendencies of
analogical reasoning. As long as judges take it as their task to
reach decisions and fashion rules that can be reconciled with pre-
vious decisions, the law is unlikely to find itself far in advance of
public expectations.56
See H.LA. Hart, The Concept of Law 56-57, 88-91 (Clarendon 2d ed 1994) (discuss-
ing the "internal aspect" of rules). The importance of this attitude stems from the nature
of rules. General rules seldom if ever dictate the right result in all the cases they govern.
It may nevertheless be desirable that people follow rules without exception if they are
likely to err in their assessment of exactly when it would be better to violate the rule. At
the same time, it is not rational for an individual to follow a rule when she believes, upon
reflection, that she ought to break the rule. From a systemic perspective, therefore, it is
desirable that the subjects of rules form the habit of following legal rules without much re-
flection. See Schauer, Playing by the Rules at 128-34 (cited in note 23) (describing the
"asymmetry of authority"); Alexander and Sherwin, Past Imperfect ch 5 (cited in note 39)
(describing the functions of rules, the irrationality of following rules, and the dilemmas
rules pose for a legal system).
' Another institutional benefit of the analogical method results not from the evolu-
tionary pace of decisionmaking but from the belief that judges are constrained by princi-
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E. Analogical Reasoning Revisited
What I have said about the epistemic and institutional bene-
fits of analogical reasoning also affects the form that analogical
reasoning should take and, in particular, what should qualify as
the basic data for analogy. Alexander assumes that judges en-
gaged in analogical reasoning work strictly from the outcomes of
prior cases-what results were reached on stated facts. The ra-
tionales and remarks that judges have offered in their opinions,
and possibly even the rules they have laid down in canonical
form, are disregarded in the process of constructing a principle
(or analogy-warranting rule) to govern the case at hand." Alex-
ander also appears to assume that every previously decided case
(or every case within the appropriate jurisdiction) is equally
authoritative as a source of analogy. 8
If the process of analogy were simply one of inventing a prin-
ciple that could explain both past and present outcomes, the re-
sult would indeed be unnecessary error with little or no compen-
sating benefit. And some of the literature on analogical reasoning
appears to take just this view. Levi insisted that judges should
reason from past results rather than rules or rationales, because
he viewed the process of analogical reasoning as a means by
which creative judges could escape the implications of deductive
reasoning and move the law forward to reflect changing circum-
stances and ideas.59 Dworkin was not much interested in the ra-
tionales of past decisions, because he sought to combine "integ-
ples or patterns of decisions that are not entirely of their own making. This advantage is
not specific to analogical reasoning: it attaches to stare decisis in any form and probably is
strongest when judges follow canonical rules announced in prior cases. In the absence of
controlling rules, however, the analogical method adds at least some appearance of con-
straint. It can be argued that the actual constraint provided by analogical reasoning is
minimal, because judges themselves must generate the analogy-warranting rules that
govern their decisions and have considerable leeway in choosing among rules. See, for ex-
ample, Schauer, Playing by the Rules at 184 (cited in note 23); Posner, Problems of Juris-
prudence at 95-96 (cited in note 23). Yet the field of eligible rules is limited by natural and
conventional categories. Schauer, Playing by the Rules at 186. Moreover, whatever its ac-
tual effects, analogical reasoning creates the impression that judges are guided by some-
thing other than their own, possibly idiosyncratic, beliefs. This in turn allows the public to
view law as stable and impartial.
" Alexander, 145 U Pa L Rev at 59 (cited in note 23) (describing Sunstein's account of
analogical reasoning); id at 72-73 (suggesting that rationales must be excluded to prevent
analogy from collapsing into deduction).
See id at 74 (describing past judgments as "fixed points" of reference that cannot be
disregarded or revised).
See Levi, Legal Reasoning at 2 (cited in note 1) (contending that judges are not
bound by prior judges' statements).
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rity" with a high level of theoretical endeavor by the individual
judge ("Hercules"). 0
The reasons I have put forward in favor of analogical rea-
soning, however, support a different understanding of the prac-
tice. If judges are truly attempting to build from, rather than
avoid or rationalize, past decisions, they will take into account
everything to be found in those decisions. Principles not fully ar-
ticulated by the author of a prior opinion can be gleaned from ex-
planatory remarks and cases cited by the author as similar or
distinct. Stated rules or principles can be expanded to include a
case that is not covered by their terms, and explanatory remarks,
citations, and trends of decision over time may suggest an anal-
ogy-warranting rule that will serve this purpose. Neither of these
strategies is strictly deductive-the present judge contributes to
the new principle or rule and reviews its moral plausibility.61 And
neither limits the source of analogy to facts and results of prior
cases. At the same time, both strategies perform the epistemic
and institutional functions I have attributed to analogical rea-
soning. They engage judges in the study of prior cases, capture
the insights of other judges, track the features of prior decisions
on which actors might rely, and hold judges to modest revisions
or expansions of existing law.
In addition, prior cases need not be treated equally as
sources for analogy. A group of closely related cases that build on
one another is a good source from which to draw an analogy-
warranting rule or principle. When there are only a few cases,
with no express relation among them, the principle is speculative
at best. Old cases or idiosyncratic cases, seldom cited, can be
passed by without much loss of epistemic value. Discriminations
of this sort add an element of discretion to analogical reasoning,
but the important part of the practice remains: the sense of obli-
gation to study prior cases and either conform to them or explain
why they should be disregarded.
CONCLUSION
I have suggested that the practice of analogical reasoning
from prior decisions has advantages, both epistemic and institu-
tional, that exceed its rational force. The arguments I have made
are quite traditional, yet they have not been prominent in other
' Dworkin, Law's Empire at 239-40, 284-85 (cited in note 1) (stating that "fit" with
past judicial rhetoric is only "one desideratum").
" See Schauer, Playing by the Rules at 183-87 (cited in note 23).
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recent defenses of analogical reasoning." Perhaps this is because
they admit that the outcome of analogical reasoning may be
flawed and accept that the method of analogy may limit the abil-
ity of judges to bring about legal and social reform.
In my view, however, these are not fatal objections. Law is
not an enterprise that admits of perfection. The most obvious
reason for this is that law must rely on general rules, which in-
evitably will dictate the wrong result in some of the cases that
fall within their terms. General rules are nevertheless justified if
they prevent more errors than they bring about.63
If I am right about the benefits of the practice of analogical
reasoning, then this practice can function in much the same way
as a good rule. By displacing open-ended reasoning, it can correct
errors and keep law on a stable path. Of course a practice such as
analogical reasoning is quite different from a rule: just how
judges are to draw comparisons among cases is not something
that can be captured in canonical form. Nevertheless, a practice
of analogical reasoning, ingrained by training and tradition, can
work indirectly-in the manner of a rule-to improve the quality
of judicial decisionmaking.
It may seem a shame to anchor the decisions of an exception-
ally wise and intelligent judge to a seriously flawed line of past
decisions when important matters are at stake. It may also be
discouraging to think that one's favorite judicial innovation might
have been passed over by a judge who felt bound to proceed by
the inhibiting method of analogy. But most judges are not excep-
tional, and most cases do not raise defining questions of social
character. The method in which judges are trained and habitu-
ated should be the one that will serve best in the mass of ordi-
nary decisions by ordinary judges. In any event, a practice such
as analogical reasoning may have little effect in extraordinary
circumstances. Because it is simply a practice, with nothing
standing behind it but habit, general acceptance, and the sense
that it has worked well over time, it will sometimes be trumped
by glaring error or urgent need.
' Sunstein makes brief reference to modesty and to concern for reliance, but distances
himself from conservative arguments on behalf of analogical decisionmaking. Sunstein,
Political Conflict at 76, 94-96 (cited in note 1).
' See note 39.
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